Abstract-Trustworthiness of software and services is a key concern for their use and adoption by organizations and endusers. Trustworthiness evaluation is an important task to support both providers and consumers in making informed decisions, i.e., for selecting components from a software marketplace. Most of the literature evaluates trustworthiness by focusing on a single dimension (e.g., from the security perspective) while there are limited contributions towards multifaceted and end-to-end trustworthiness evaluation. Our analysis reveals that there is a lack of a comprehensive framework for comparative, multifaceted end-to-end trustworthiness evaluation, which takes into account different layers of abstractions of both the system topology and its trustworthiness. In this paper, we provide a framework for end-to-end trustworthiness evaluation using computational approaches, which is based on aggregating certified trustworthiness values for individual components. The resulting output supports in defining trustworthiness requirements for a software component to be developed and eventually integrated within a system, as well as obtaining trustworthiness evidences for a composite system before the actual deployment. Thereby it supports the designer in analyzing the end-to-end trustworthiness. An application example illustrates the application of the framework.
INTRODUCTION
Modern information and communication technologies enable significant improvements and facilitated the growth of Socio-Technical Systems (STS), and their integration in our daily life. STS comprise information systems, software and computer systems, mechanical parts, as well as organizations and humans that use the system in order to achieve a goal [1, 2] . An STS is shaped by technologies and services that contain software as core elements. The users of these STS depend on these software services for performing their activities in business or organizational settings, and in their social life. Therefore, trustworthiness of these systems is a key factor for a user to trust and adopt them. The software elements of these systems should be designed and manufactured in such a way that they satisfy trustworthiness requirements. It is not only essential to use constructive quality assurance techniques, such as best practices for development processes [3, 4] , but also to analytically evaluate the trustworthiness of a desired system early in the design phase. Trustworthiness can be seen as an objective system property reflecting its ability to assure that it will perform as expected [5] , e.g., an elderly user of a health care service on the web needs confidence that it will meet her usability expectations, whereas organizations require confidence about their business critical data. In order to achieve objectivity, we need to measure certain system qualities that are relevant to achieve trustworthiness. To this end, metrics can be used in order to quantify trustworthiness attributes [6] . Furthermore, measurements and corresponding metric values can be used as evidences for certifying a certain quality level.
Systems are often composed of existing software services or components that are certified and provided on a software market place (cf., e.g., [7] ). Component-based development (cf. [8] ) poses the challenge of considering different component structures for determining the "End-to-End" (E2E) trustworthiness of the overall system. Different certified metric values of all the involved components have to be aggregated considering the specific system topology that they are part of. Particularly, redundancy is often introduced in system design, for instance, as a means to increase trustworthiness in terms of higher reliability or availability.
Another challenge consists in aggregating the resulting E2E trustworthiness values on different levels of granularity or abstraction, e.g., on the level of trustworthiness attributes or even for measuring the overall trustworthiness as a very highlevel trustworthiness indication. Despite a large number of indications in the literature about evaluation and documentation of design decisions based on evaluation results, the E2E evaluation of multi-faceted trustworthiness remains an open research question. There are approaches that merely focus on e.g., reliability [9] . However, trustworthiness is a broadspectrum term with notions including e.g. reliability, security, performance, and usability as relevant trustworthiness attributes [6] . Therefore, a holistic taxonomy of software quality attributes that contribute to trustworthiness and corresponding metrics (presented in our previous work [6] ) is used as a basis.
Thus, there are two dimensions that need to be taken into account when evaluating the overall system trustworthiness; the first dimension is the overall system structure while the second is the level of granularity of E2E calculation, e.g., regarding a hierarchy of trustworthiness attributes, and sets of different metrics. Our approach builds upon available formulas that consider different system structures for calculating overall trustworthiness.
This paper addresses the problem of evaluating the overall trustworthiness of STS, with a particular focus on software assets that are accessible via an online marketplace. Software marketplaces allow service providers to compose a new system by selecting system assets and orchestrating them based on their trustworthiness certificates [7, 10] . We build upon different metrics to quantify system trustworthiness attributes, and use the trustworthiness metric values in the certificate of each software component as parameters for calculating the overall E2E trustworthiness. To this end, workflow models serve as adequate abstractions to specify sequences of assets that are involved in achieving some task. Based on these lowlevel E2E trustworthiness values, more aggregate values can be calculated, eventually resulting in an overall trustworthiness value. E2E values can be used as evidence of the system's trustworthiness, and to compare different candidate system compositions.
We propose a framework that supports designers in composing E2E formulas and performing the trustworthiness evaluation process. This framework includes metric skeletons and templates, as well as guidance for determining aggregated values on different abstraction layers. As an initial evaluation, we present the application of our approach to evaluate the E2E trustworthiness of an exemplary system from the Ambient Assisted Living (AAL) domain. We also show how the proposed framework supports E2E trustworthiness evaluation.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: A brief overview of existing techniques for evaluating trustworthiness of software is provided in Section II. In Section III, we present definitions of the fundamental concepts. Section IV describes our approach in evaluating E2E trustworthiness. Section V presents an application example using two scenarios. Section VI concludes the paper and elaborates on future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Service composition and evaluation with respect to trustworthiness or quality of service has been studied. Klatt et al. propose to use a service quality prediction of composed services in order to support service composition considering service quality [11] . Quality evaluation is also an integral part of the service composition framework proposed by Liu et al. in [12] . Elshaafi et al. present an approach towards measuring the trustworthiness of a service composition with focus on runtime monitoring [13] . They provide formulas that allow for calculating the trustworthiness (in terms of reputation, reliability, and security) of composite services, taking into account several service composition constructs such as sequence, parallel, loop, choice, discriminator, and multichoice-multimerge patterns . Zhao et al. propose a framework for trustworthy web service management, which also involves formulas for aggregating the availability, reliability, and response time of services composed in sequence, parallel, conditional, and loop structures [14] . Other approaches, such as [15] focus on reputation by aggregating service ratings in order to determine the rating of a provider. Quality of Service (QoS) aggregation can be applied in order to determine the QoS of a web service workflow based on the QoS of each involved or executed web service [16, 17] . Cardoso et al. utilize graph reduction mechanisms and respective formulas for aggregating time, cost, and reliability of service workflows [15] . Workflow composition patterns and aggregation schemes are also given in [17] . Hwang et al. propose a probabilistic approach for estimating the QoS of service compositions, which is based on more elaborate metrics, and addresses uncertainty given for QoS values [16] . They consider sequence, parallel, choice, discriminator, and loop structures in addition to interleaved parallel, multiple choices, and m-out-of-n constructs. Related to the use of metrics, Wang and Crowcroft distinguish additive, multiplicative, and concave metrics for QoS routing, which can be considered as a problem that also applies to service composition [18] . Raheja and Gullo considered that the reliability of the whole system depends on the reliability of its components; thus, formulas that represent the different component structures are used in order to calculate the overall reliability [9] .
Although the related approaches summarized above support a wide range of system structures, they focus on a limited set of trustworthiness metrics, neglecting the system trustworthiness dimension previously described. Furthermore, we identified the need for establishing a comprehensive framework that supports a large set of trustworthiness metrics. More specifically, each trustworthiness metric is mapped to a metric type (multiplicative, concave, and additive) and has either a positive or a negative interpretation (whether higher values are desirable or not). For example, while both the availability and the error rate are of multiplicative type, the former has a positive interpretation while the latter has a negative one. Furthermore, each trustworthiness metric belongs to one trustworthiness attribute. The above information, together with the system structure, is used to calculate the overall trustworthiness metric in our approach. Even though we restrict to sequential topologies, we can support more complex structures by allowing redundancy in specific asset instances (namely parallel and "k out of N" constructs).
III. FUNDAMENTALS
This section presents the fundamental concepts that form the basis for our approach.
A. Trustworthiness Attributes and Metrics
We analyzed software quality attributes and their contribution to trustworthiness, and presented a comprehensive set of trustworthiness attributes that should be considered in the design of trustworthy STS [6] . This approach covers a wide range of quality attributes instead of only focusing on e.g. security. The concrete trustworthiness attributes are domainand application-dependent; e.g., in health care applications, the set of attributes which have primarily been considered consists of availability, confidentiality, integrity, maintainability, reliability and safety, but also performance and timeliness. Trustworthiness attributes, e.g. "availability", can be classified and aggregated by higher-level trustworthiness categories, such as "dependability". In order to quantify trustworthiness attributes, metrics can be systematically derived. Hence, trustworthiness metrics serve the purpose of objectively identifying and measuring real-world properties that characterize trustworthiness attributes. Regarding softwareintensive systems, Kan [19] distinguishes three types of software metrics: product metrics, process metrics, and project metrics. In this paper, we focus on product metrics regarding the characteristics of software. According to IEEE 1061 [20] , a software quality metric is a "function whose inputs are software data and whose output is a single numerical value that can be interpreted as the degree to which software possesses a given attribute that affects its quality". Thus, metrics allow for measuring and quantifying certain trustworthiness attributes by means of more concrete properties of a sys the mean response time of the system for pe transaction could be used as a metric fo "Performance" attribute.
B. Component-based System Design
An STS consists of several assets (i.e., an an STS [21] ), including physical, technical o well as humans. An asset is an abstract, basi block that may manifest in different impleme instances from different vendors).
Component-Based Software Engine extensively reusing existing componen development, and focuses on e.g. compone models [1] . In the area of Service-Orien (SOA), software components, which are ind environment, and loosely coupled, are used systems that support business processes. The is used in the context of web service compo describe business processes, and can be re services that support them [1] . BPMN, a m for representing business processes and con used for web service orchestration [22] . modelling of component-based systems, the Diagram, as used in Reliability Engineer systems, allows the designer to model diff types, i.e., series, parallel (for modelling combined series-parallel structures [9] . Relat composition, there are some more specializ description languages such as BPEL [23] .
Software marketplaces, such as the Ama Marketplace [24] , provide platforms for offering software services to organizations. I the problem of trustworthiness of the certification is a mechanism to guarantee service [25] . For instance, Ali et al. prese system that enables the provision of security The concept of a Trustworthy Software incorporates machine-readable security certif for matching these trustworthiness ev requirements. The certification approach can including multi-faceted trustworthiness corresponding metric values as evidences [26 
IV. FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING E TRUSTWORTHINESS
This section describes our E2E trustwor framework. We build upon existing app trustworthiness attribute classification, formulas for composite system structures, an a comprehensive framework that provides with guidance for evaluating multi-faceted t different layers of abstraction. The aim of th facilitate the evaluation process, and to str reports as the basis for selecting a certain desi Our framework covers two dime trustworthiness evaluation, as depicted in F hand, the structure or topology of the entir involves many different assets that partici control or data flow relation to support a busi [10] .
Marketplace [7] ficates, and allows idences to user n be supported by attributes and 6].
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rthiness evaluation proaches towards evaluation, and nd unify them into system designers trustworthiness on he framework is to ructure evaluation ign alternative. ensions of E2E Fig. 1 . On the one e software system ipate in a certain iness process, or to achieve some business goal. terms of workflows. For in structures are often used to inc such as performance, reliability aspects of system structures nee determining the trustworthines can be abstracted by focusing be characterized by multiple wo trustworthiness of both single system structures can be eva abstraction or granularity. For metrics are used to provide trustworthiness properties, wh aggregated on the more abs attributes such as "availabi trustworthiness granularity pro value for the whole system. Fig. 1 .
Overview of the End-t Fram
The framework consists of t provides general concepts for E presented. These concepts fo calculation-based trustworthin system structures on different l describe our approach for trustworthiness of a whole sy aggregates the partial trustwo asset instance composing a S abstraction mechanisms and a aggregating trustworthiness v granularity, which takes the sy account. In the following subs parts of the framework in more
A. Ontology for Design-Time E Evaluation
In order to establish a soun E2E trustworthiness evaluation concepts that need to be consid faceted trustworthiness of comp ontology of our E2E trustw which defines the relevant conc
The abstract concept o represented by "Assets" and "A is necessary to differentiate building blocks and concret participate in a redundancy r concrete manifestation of an category"). For example, "DB service offered on the Marketp "Database Management Sys This structures is described in nstance, parallel or redundant crease trustworthiness properties y, or availability. These different ed to be taken into account when ss values of entire systems, and on a complete system that may orkflows. On the other hand, the e software services and overall aluated on different levels of r instance, at the lowest level, detailed evidences of specific hile these values have to be stract level of trustworthiness ility". The highest level of vides an overall trustworthiness to-End Trustworthiness Evaluation ework. two parts. First, an ontology that E2E trustworthiness evaluation is orm the basis for establishing ness evaluation of composite evels of granularity. Second, we objectively evaluating E2E stem's quality attributes, which rthiness measurements of each STS. Specifically, we describe related process of successively values on different levels of ystem structure or topology into sections, we describe these two detail.
End-to-End Trustworthiness
nd theoretical fundament for our approach, we define some basic dered when assessing the multiposite systems. Fig. 2 shows the worthiness evaluation approach, cepts as well as their relations. f "components" of STS is Asset Instances". This distinction between general and abstract te implementations that may elation. An asset instance is a n asset (also denoted "asset BMS_1" could be a software place as an instance of the asset stem". Certificates for asset instances are provided by a Certification Authority that evaluates a (software) implementation in order to confirm that it meets certain trustworthiness goals. A certificate describes all observed trustworthiness properties of the software, as well as related evidence in terms of certified metric values (cf. [26] ). A workflow is a model that specifies the set of asset instances as well as cardinality and their interrelations, e.g., in the control flow of performing some business process. The "Workflow" concept is an appropriate abstraction mechanism to focus on the aspects that are necessary for determining E2E trustworthiness formulas. More details on the information that is (graphically) modelled in a workflow are presented in next subsection. An End-to-End Formula is a template or function that allows for calculating the trustworthiness of composite system structures represented in terms of workflows. It requires metric values for each involved asset instance as arguments, and returns one value that characterizes the trustworthiness of the whole workflow.
In the following, we describe our approach and the way that we use the described elements for evaluating trustworthiness of composite systems. Specifically, we elaborate on how an E2E formula as the central artifact is created and used to evaluate a system with aggregation of trustworthiness values at different levels of granularity.
B. End-to-End Trustworthiness Computation
This section presents our approach towards calculating E2E trustworthiness using the proposed framework. Specifically, we describe the steps of an evaluation process that takes into account different system structures as well as different levels of granularity. First, we show how adequate models are created in order to depict system and redundancy structures. Then, we describe how aggregation mechanisms are used in order to abstract from certain trustworthiness details in order to eventually derive an overall system trustworthiness value.
1) Workflow Modelling and End-to-End Formula Creation
The computational approach towards E2E trustworthiness evaluation relies upon the availability of metric values for each asset of the system as a means to quantitatively express trustworthiness. The metric values can be found, for instance, in certificates of the asset instances that are available on a marketplace, as described in Section III. Thus, the E2E computation is performed for concrete instances of the general assets that build up an abstract system.
Depending on the characteristics of its intended usage scenarios, a system can have arbitrary structures (sequential, tree, network, etc.), where the nodes could be seen as the building blocks of that system. A workflow is a specific composition (or sequence) of asset instances that are orchestrated and invoked in order to achieve a certain goal or to support some business process. A graphical workflow model (i.e., the workflow graph) aims at guiding the evaluation process by modelling and determining which asset instances are functionally connected and should thus be evaluated together in an E2E configuration. Hence, a system can be described by multiple workflows and respective graphs. Each workflow determines a particular part of the system that is in focus of evaluation, and contains vital redundancy information. An example of such a workflow graph is illustrated in the Section V. We propose to represent the following information in an appropriate workflow model:
• (Sub-)System topology: The topology includes the asset categories, and their relations.
• Assets and asset instances: Assets are abstract building blocks of a system, while asset instances denote concrete implementations or realizations of them.
• Start and end node: E2E trustworthiness evaluation requires the definition of two nodes (i.e., system assets) as a starting and end node of a workflow sequence.
• Redundancy group and type: In addition to the interaction relations of asset instances, it is also necessary to model the redundancy among several asset instances of the same asset. A redundancy group contains a number of asset instances that participate in a of redundancy relation in order to e.g. increase the availability of the provided service. The redundancy type describes the minimum number of asset instances in a certain redundancy group, which are required to successfully process a request, e.g., any one of four ("OR" type), two out of four , or all four ("AND" type). Three types of E2E metrics have been defined in the literature [18, 27] : additive metrics (e.g., cost, the response time), multiplicative metrics (e.g., mean availability), and concave metrics (e.g., encryption key length). The metrics type has to be considered when determining the respective E2E formula. Table I provides skeletons of the mathematical formula that would be constructed for computing the trustworthiness value of a single asset (or asset category) . Such an asset category is assumed to be consisting of ൌ ͳǡ ǥ ǡ asset instances, where ୧ is the trustworthiness metric value that characterizes the trustworthiness of the -th asset instance, and consequently appears in its trustworthiness certificate. Depending on the metric type (concave, multiplicative, or additive) as well as the metric target type, we get a different formula, e.g., concave metrics depend on the bottleneck asset instance and thus the minimum or maximum of the asset instance metric values is needed (e.g., the asset employing the smallest encryption key length). We should note that the formulae appearing for multiplicative metrics refer to the K-out-of-N case, which can be used to create the rest "extreme" constructs as well. More specifically, if ൌ ͳ then it refers to the "OR" construct, while if ൌ we get "AND".
For simplification and better readability of the multiplicative formula skeleton, we assume that all asset instances belong to the same asset category, i.e., ୧ ൌ for ൌ ͳǡ ǥ ǡ , in contrast to the general case where ୧ ൏ ୨ . The rationale is that we consider all the combinations where at least asset instances will complete a certain task. Thus, in the example of an asset category composed of three asset instances following the 2-out-of-3 construct we would consider four cases. Following a binary representation, where 0 refers to the event where a certain asset instance is not able to complete the task, and the following cases would be considered for metrics targeting at higher values: 011, 101, 110 and 111. Note that the formula skeleton for additive metrics is valid only for sequential compositions that have no redundancy.
Given that a workflow usually contains more than one asset category, the next step is to compose the E2E formula, denoted . Table I provides a skeleton of the formula for all asset categories, say ൌ ͳǡ ǥ ǡ depending on the metric type. 
Multiplicative Higher values
Lower values
The formula skeletons provide valuable guidance for representing different system structures and asset redundancy types in the form of a mathematical model for calculating E2E trustworthiness metric values with respect to related metrics. Metric values of single asset instances are then used as parameters for the E2E metrics that have been defined based on the workflows. In particular, an E2E metric value is derived for each workflow of the system, and each provided metric.
2) Aggregation of Trustworthiness Values
So far, the focus of evaluation was limited to a certain number of separate workflows, and individual metrics. As mentioned above, our E2E trustworthiness evaluation framework also considers different levels of granularity w.r.t. the trustworthiness of a system. To this end, the concept of trustworthiness attributes is an appropriate means to abstract from different metrics that may be available for a certain attribute in the first place. Since the resulting metric values still pertain to certain workflows, they can be aggregated by focusing on a trustworthiness attribute related to the whole system, which may be characterized by multiple workflows. Calculating the minimum of all the different values pertaining to the workflows seems an adequate mechanism and in order to guarantee consistency the metrics where lower values are desirable are transformed into higher ones. Another approach could be determining the weighted average among the different values. Finally, the last step is to abstract from multiple workflows and calculate one overall E2E value. To this end, the designer can specify weights for each attribute, and calculate the weighted average. Fig. 3 illustrates the steps of aggregating trustworthiness values on different levels of granularity.
To summarize, our approach allows for calculating E2E trustworthiness metric values on the following layers of abstraction:
• E2E values per Workflow and Metric: Given a workflow and a particular metric that can be used to estimate a certain trustworthiness attribute, we calculate an E2E metric using the E2E formula skeleton.
• E2E values per Workflow and Attribute: For determining the E2E value related to a certain workflow and trustworthiness attribute, the minimum value of all E2E values that are available for each of the metric pertaining to that attribute, is calculated.
• E2E values per Attribute: The E2E value per trustworthiness attribute is determined by calculating the minimum value for all the given workflows, related to this attribute.
• An E2E value per system (overall E2E trustworthiness):
In order to calculate one E2E trustworthiness metric value for the whole system described by several trustworthiness attributes and workflows, weights are specified by the designer for each trustworthiness attribute.
V. APPLICATION EXAMPLE
This section provides an overview of a case example that demonstrates the application of our E2E trustworthiness evaluation framework. The example is taken from the domain of Ambient-Assisted Living (AAL). An exemplary Fall Management System monitors an elderly person at his or her home with respect to emergency situations, such as a fall. Detected emergency situations are reported to a central alarm handling service that will decide upon the actions to be taken. Depending on the severity of the emergency, relatives can be notified, or ambulances requested. Fig. 4 shows an exemplary design-time model of the Fall Management System, and includes the main (software) components.
Using the E2E trustworthiness evaluation framework as guidance, a system designer or composer is supported in making informed decisions on the system configuration. By facilitating the generation of trustworthiness values of different granularity, our approach supports the decision-making process in the design phase. In other words, the designer is able to perform "what-if" scenarios and adjust the system structure and redundancy levels in order to meet her goals.
In an initial step, the designer selects the evaluation criteria instances, including the main "EMHT_1 "EMHT_2" (indicated by the "OR" type in pool of three Ambulance Service instance should be available at a certain point in time out of 3" redundancy type). These asset ins groups are modeled in a sequential order, directed edges between them. The asset insta workflow are part of a certain usage scenario " and a backup the graph), and a es, one of which (denoted by the "1 stances or instance indicated by the ances involved in a o of the system that is to be developed. In particul the "PERS_App_1" has som either "EMHT_1" or "EMHT_ of three Ambulance Services. functionality is provided, e.g., reaction to an emergency alarm
The second workflow gra another scenario or function tness (60%). The definitions of are given in [6] . a set of workflow graphs, each or usage scenario of the system. e system model shown in Fig. 4 . de some asset categories that are ptions about the trustworthiness ces. Even though for example the workflow concept allows us ware assets that are available on a o workflow graphs for the Fall n in Fig. 5 . ee asset categories defined in the n in Fig. 4 . For each one the asset instances that are available ons of the assets, as well as their dinality and redundancy type). In stem composition consists of a vice, i.e., "PERS_App_1" which or mobile phones, two EMHT lar, this workflow specifies that me functional dependency with _2", which in turn calls one out Thereby, some overall system the request of an ambulance as m handled by the EMHT. aph shown in Fig. 5 describes nality, which should also be provided by the Fall Management System. It involves a slightly different set of asset categories that are used to notify relatives in an emergency situation. Again, we focus on software assets, so the notification is performed by instances of the "Emergency Notification App" asset in this workflow. We assume that at least two out of three relatives should be informed in this concrete case, so that a minimum of two respective applications are involved in successfully carrying out the scenario described in this workflow.
The next step includes providing a trustworthiness certificate for each asset instance involved in the workflows. Certificates carry the trustworthiness metric values that have been approved by a certification authority, and are used as the basis for E2E trustworthiness calculation. Then, as depicted in Fig. 3 , the first step of trustworthiness computation consists of creating an E2E formula for each trustworthiness metric and workflow. Based on the metric type and interpretation, as well as information about the involved component's interactions present in the workflow graphs, an E2E formula for each trustworthiness metric and workflow is created.
For instance, the EMHT instances are modeled as an AND (or "multi-choice and multi-merge") structure, while the Ambulance Service instances and the respective group have "k out of n" semantics. In case of Workflow 1, the following E2E formula will be created for multiplicative metrics that have a positive interpretation (higher values being desirable):
where ୧ǡ୨ is the Metric value of the asset instance for metric . Please note that some asset instance names from Fig. 5 have been abbreviated. This formula represents a generic template that needs to be filled with metric values for each involved asset instance. The metric values extracted from certificates are used to calculate separate E2E values for each metric and workflow. In our example, the "mean run-time availability" metric, which belongs to the "availability" attribute, is a multiplicative one, has positive interpretation, and is composed and calculated using formula above, resulting value of approximately 79%. All involved software assets in the system composition, and redundancies are taken into account. As another example for this multiplicative metric, for workflow 2 it is calculated in (2). Similarly, for each metric, a separate E2E metric will be created, and corresponding trustworthiness values will be calculated respectively. For instance, in the case of concave metrics where lower values are desirable (e.g., "mean error rate" that belongs to the reliability trustworthiness attribute), the following E2E formula will be created as shown in (3) .
The formulae for the rest metrics would be created in similar way, according to Table I . Trustworthiness attributes can be quantified by multiple metrics. Hence, the framework presented in Section IV allows for aggregating and calculating E2E metrics on different levels of granularity.
The first step is to abstract from metrics and calculate an E2E value on the level of trustworthiness attributes per workflow. More specifically, if multiple metrics characterize an attribute, in this example we use the minimum value per workflow and metric as the E2E value for that attribute and workflow combination.
In order to do so, in this case metrics with negative interpretation are transformed into ones with a positive interpretation by taking the residual complementary probability value.
Considering a trustworthiness attribute, e.g., availability identified by "Attr", which contains the trustworthiness metrics ͳǡǥǡ ǡ its value for the workflow 1 is computed as follows: ୭୰୩ϐ୪୭୵ଵǡ୲୲୰ ൌ ሺ ୭୰୩ϐ୪୭୵ଵǡ୫ଵ ǡ ୭୰୩ϐ୪୭୵ଵǡ୫ଶ ǡ ୭୰୩ϐ୪୭୵ଵǡ୫ଷ ǡ ୭୰୩ϐ୪୭୵ଵǡ୫ସ ǡ ୭୰୩ϐ୪୭୵ଵǡ୫ହ ǡ ୭୰୩ϐ୪୭୵ଵǡ୫ ሻ ൌ ሺͲǤͻǡͲǤ͵ǡͲǤ͵ͺͷǡͲǤͷǡͲǤͺͻǡͲǤͶͺሻ ൌ ͲǤ͵ͺͷ. (4) According to the framework, the next step is to abstract from several workflows, and to compute the overall E2E values of the whole system per trustworthiness attribute. Following a similar "pessimistic" approach, this value is determined accordingly by calculating the minimum value of all workflows. For the attribute "Availability", this will result in the following E2E value:
୲୲୰ ൌ ሺ ୭୰୩ϐ୪୭୵ଵǡ୲୲୰ ǡ ୭୰୩ϐ୪୭୵ଶǡ୲୲୰ ሻ ൌ ሺͲǤͻǡͲǤ͵ሻ ൌ ͲǤ͵. (5) Finally, the overall E2E trustworthiness of the whole system has to be calculated, as an abstraction from separate attribute values. To this end, the weights that have been initially assigned to each attribute are taken into account in order to compute the weighted average. This calculation is reflected in the following formula for our example: The resulting E2E trustworthiness values on different levels of granularity (i.e., per workflow and metric, per workflow and attribute, per attribute, as well as one overall value) allow the designer to evaluate and document the trustworthiness of different alternative system compositions on the instance level, and consequently helps in making informed design decisions.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we addressed the problems of commonly used evaluation approaches for evaluating E2E trustworthiness. Component-based software development introduces the challenge of considering different component structures for determining an "end-to-end" trustworthiness value based on metrics. The system structure needs to be considered and reflected in the E2E trustworthiness metric that is used to calculate these values. Especially redundancy structures, which are introduced at design-time to assure correct system performance and thereby increase trustworthiness levels, require consideration in E2E trustworthiness calculation. The explicit description of respective metrics, which can provide meaningful statements about the trustworthiness, is a precondition for the calculation of E2E trustworthiness value, which requires certified metric values of each involved asset as parameters. This evaluation result will be documented and used to support making informed design decisions.
Using the Eclipse Process Framework we will describe the process of applying the proposed framework in more detail (cf. [4] ). This will provide system designers with guidance on when and how to evaluate the designed STS within the development life-cycle, and which work products are expected as outcome of applying the techniques. Furthermore, our computational approach, which is performed on application level and relies on measurements of trustworthiness attributes of software asset instances available on the marketplace, can be complemented by a risk-management approach. The latter is helpful on the higher level of abstract assets, i.e., asset categories that can be realized by multiple instance implementations. Specifically, at design-time it is essential to identify potential threats to trustworthiness, and related controls to prevent threat activity at run-time. Using risk analysis in a complementary way to the computation framework presented herein can be the basis for a more comprehensive trustworthiness evaluation of STS. The initial steps and concept toward complementing computational evaluation are sketched in our work [28] .
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